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I. INTRODUCTION
Rule #1: “Insist on proving that torture was inflicted.
This guidance was included in a notorious al-Qaeda handbook that
was discovered in a Manchester, England safehouse.1 That handbook raised
*
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eyebrows for not only its meticulously cold direction toward facilitating
terrorist operations, but also for its perceptive legal savvy relating to Western courts.2 But, while the extent of how far this manual was followed is
certainly questionable, the fact remains that accused terrorist operatives
since September 11, 2001 have followed its principles relating to the torture
message and are credited with ―paralyzing‖ international intelligence services and military operations in a manner that is much more effective than
bombs and rifles.3 As such, this tactic goes beyond merely scoring public
relations points, and instead achieves tangible tactical victories, albeit in an
unconventional manner. The weapon is an attorney and the battlefield is the
courts. The battle cry is ―torture.‖ It has taken nearly a decade for world
governments to develop a means for fighting back.
Detainees and litigants ranging from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to Pakistani courts have dutifully followed principles of the step-by-step alQaeda handbook instruction as their torture claims blitzed through the media and legal systems.4 Defense counsel and human rights organizations
1

In United Kingdom v. Abu Hamza, a convicted terrorist was found to be in possession of
the manual. Abu Hamza has since appealed to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. See The Al Qaeda Manual, http://www.justice.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf (last visited
Sept. 25, 2010).
2
The U.S. Department of Justice posting of the manual was controversial because some
worried that it would provide wider reach for potential terrorists. See Matthew Davis, US
Under Fire over al-Qaeda Guide, BBC NEWS, July 27, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/4722833.stm; see also Tung Yin, Boumediene and Lawfare, 43 U. RICH. L. REV.
865, 880–84 (2009) (describing how the al-Qaeda manual relates to lawfare as detainees
provoke action from the guards in order to exploit and manipulate the system); see also David B. Rivkin et al, Lawfare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2007, at A11(stating that the al-Qaeda
manual instructs detained operatives to claim torture and mistreatment).
3
The deadly 2010 suicide bombing against CIA officials in Khost, Afghanistan and the
1993 shooting attack outside CIA headquarters in Northern Virginia caused some ripple
effects, but did not directly cause massive effects on worldwide intelligence operations. In
contrast, civil lawsuits filed in U.K. courts against British government security agencies such
as MI5 and MI6 by accused al-Qaeda terror operatives such as Binyam Mohamad and Moazzam Begg are said to have ―‗paralyzed‘ the security services with legal paperwork.‖ See Tom
Dunn,
Terror
Camp Compensation
Sham,
THE SUN,
July
7,
2010,
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/3044275/Terror-camp-compo-sham-12-getpayouts-up-to-500k-each.html.
4
Top JTF-GTMO officials, as well as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld offer detailed instances of detainees using manual guidance during and after detention. See Donna
Miles, Al Qaeda Manual Drives Detainee Behavior at Guantanamo Bay, AM. FORCES PRESS
SERVICE, June 29, 2005, http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx? ID=16270; see
also Al-Adahi v. Obama, 2010 WL 2756551, at 9 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 13, 2010) (emphasis added)
(―The court‘s omissions are particularly striking in light of the instructions in al-Qaida‘s
training manuals for resisting interrogation. For those who belong to al-Qaida, ‗[c]onfronting
the interrogator and defeating him is part of your jihad.‘ To this end al-Qaida members are
instructed to resist interrogation by developing a cover story, by refusing to answer questions, by recanting or changing answers already given, by giving as vague an answer as poss-
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continued the ―torture‖ narrative as they amassed public relations, political,
and legal victories.5 For example, federal judges in habeas corpus cases
ordered accused terrorists freed because the government often could not
prove the negative, or in other words, had no evidence one way or the other
that could contest both detainee and witness assertions that torture occurred.6 A military commission case against an Afghani accused of attacking a U.S. Army convoy in 2002 did not fare much better for the government after confessions to American interrogators were thrown out due to
assertions that Afghan forces issued verbal threats at the time of capture.7
All of this had occurred masterfully despite the fact that many other
torture and mistreatment claims were quietly debunked.8 Still, the tactic was
proving to be a winner with politicians and the media, as well as the courtroom. In 2009, Barack Obama‘s first act as President was to remove the
international rebuke over Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) by ordering its detainees transferred to a U.S. prison facility.9 This offered proof that the alQaeda guidance of using lawfare—legal recourse as a weapon in shaping
the global battlefield—was reaping dividends.10 And, indeed, the law has
been used as a weapon. Consider that the North Vietnamese military tactic
in the late 1960s and early 1970s was to use battlefield attrition and guerrilla
warfare to wear down the American public‘s will to continue supporting the
fight. In the case of the war against al-Qaeda, a calculated legal effort has
accomplished similar tactical objectives without the need to conduct major
ible, and by claiming torture. Put bluntly, the instructions to detainees are to make up a story
and lie.‖).
5
See generally Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantanamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1683 (2009). Efforts against others via administrative
means also took place to include complaints with state medical boards relating to psychologists who treated Guantanamo Bay detainees. See Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Psychologists
Face Guantanamo Abuse Claim, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 7, 2010, available at http://www.
cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2010/07/army_psychologists_face_guanta.html.
6
By suppressing statements and evidence derived by witnesses who were alleged to have
been tortured, there was not enough evidence left to justify detention. See Abdah v. Obama,
2010 WL 1626073, at *6–7 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2010).
7
Military Commission Ruling, United States v. Jawad (CMCR) (No. 08-4), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/d20081223Jawadexhibitsa-h.pdf.
8
See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008) (agreeing with the lower
court‘s ruling that found itself ―left with lingering questions concerning the credibility of Mr.
Abu Ali and his claim that he was tortured‖); see also United States v. Paracha, 313
Fed.Appx. 347, 349–50 (2d Cir. 2008).
9
Mark Mazzetti, Obama Issues Directive to Shut Down Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/us/politics/22gitmo.html.
10
Colonel Kelly D. Wheaton, Strategic Lawyering: Realizing the Potential of Military
Lawyers at the Strategic Level, THE ARMY LAW., Sept. 2006, at 1; see also Lawfare, The
Latest in Asymmetries, Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 18, 2003), http://www.cfr.org/
publication.html?id=5772 (―Lawfare is a strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for
traditional military means to achieve military objectives.‖).
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offensive operations.11 By following what was tantamount to scripted legal
advice, detainees and their advocates in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks
launched a massive campaign through various court systems worldwide.12
The common theme of these legal attacks was ―torture.‖13 And the weight of
these attacks went beyond the confines of moral and public relations arguments as they also led to policy and strategic pressures that were far removed from the courtroom. The result often manifested itself into a form of
tactical lawfare due to al-Qaeda‘s ability to shape the physical battlefield
through its cumulative legal approach.14
However, the story does not end there. Subtle but significant
changes in 2010 toward how claims of torture are handled within the Military Commissions courtroom appear to offer a de facto method of fighting
back against dubious assertions.15 And, perhaps even more significant, is
widespread evidence that the detainees themselves—longtime adherents to
the principles of the al-Qaeda guidance—began clamoring in 2009 to remain in the relative Geneva Convention-sanctioned luxury of GTMO rather
than transfer to an awaiting life of isolation and institutionalization within
the U.S. prison system.16 Finally, options exist that can be implemented to
significantly phase out the ability of al-Qaeda and its supporters to use the
11

Poll numbers have steadily dropped in regard to Afghanistan War support, while alQaeda and Taliban leaders such as Abdul Hafiz have been released from Guantanamo Bay
and returned to the fight against the United States and its allies. See Susan Crabtree, Republicans to Obama: No Detainee Transfers to Afghanistan, THE HILL, Mar. 30, 2010,
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/89819-gop-lawmakers-to-obama-no-detaineetransfers-to-afghanistan-. But like the Vietnam-era political climate where the majority of
Americans were arguably in support of the war and were merely overshadowed by anti-war
activists, a similar climate is occurring in regard to the Afghanistan War and Guantanamo
Bay detention policy. See 75% Worried That Gitmo Closing will Set Dangerous Terrorists
Free, RASMUSSEN REPORTS, Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_
content/politics/general_politics/august_2009/75_worried_that_gitmo_closing_will_set_dang
erous_terrorists_free.
12
While many of the landmark cases adjudicated broader detainee rights, the significant
undercurrent revolved around torture and mistreatment. See Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F.
Supp. 2d 191, 192–93 (D.D.C. 2008). See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
13
See generally Abu Ali, supra note 8; see also U.S. v. Abu Ali, 395 F.Supp.2d 338
(E.D.Va. 2008) (Mem. Opinion).
14
Dungan offers an excellent analysis on lawfare strategies employed by detainees at or
near the point of capture. Captain C. Peter Dungan, Fighting Lawfare at the Special Operations Task Force Level, SPECIAL WARFARE, Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 9.
15
See DEP‘T. OF DEF., THE MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS (Apr. 27, 2010) (signed
into effect by Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense); See also Military Commissions Act of
2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948 (2009).
16
The author has conducted various interviews with sources that deal directly with the
detainees. Alex Spillius, Guantanamo Suspects Want to Stay, Say Officials, TELEGRAPH,
Nov. 1, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/6481071/
Guantnamo-suspects-want-to-stay-say-officials.html.
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cumulative mistreatment narrative as ammunition for waging tactical lawfare.
II. CLAIMING TORTURE TO SHAPE THE BATTLEFIELD
If lawfare was al-Qaeda‘s battlefield tactic, then the ―torture‖ battle
cry must also be construed as its ammunition. The first publicized claims of
torture relating to the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks occurred almost immediately after photographs emanating from Guantanamo Bay‘s Camp XRay leaked to the press.17 The photos featured men in orange jumpsuits living in outdoor cages.18 Interestingly, Camp X-Ray was initially built as a
detention facility for Haitian migrants during the 1990s.19 And, despite the
fact that the orange jump suits and Camp X-ray cages were limited to the
first GTMO arrivals during a two-month span, the image and legacy endures.20
From there, photographs from Iraq‘s Abu Ghraib prison became a
national embarrassment while ―waterboarding‖ became a household term,
particularly after the U.S. government acknowledged that this activity took
place against at least two detainees.21 But waterboarding was only one complaint relating to both the confirmed and alleged use of torture perpetrated

17

In Pictures: Camp X-Ray Prisoners, BBC News, Jan. 20, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/americas/1771816.stm.
18
Id.
19
MAJOR CHRISTOPHER A. BROWN, GUANTANAMO BAY: A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, 8
(Air University Press 2008); see also Joseph C. Sweeney, Guantanamo and U.S. Law, 30
FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 673, 715–16 (2007).
20
Sweeney, supra note 19, at n.193. (―Guantanamo‘s uses as a detention center or prison,
designed to produce intelligence for the war on terror rather than to serve punitive or correctional purposes, began in January 2002 when a temporary external stockade, Camp X-Ray,
was hastily thrown together to receive prisoners from the Afghanistan War. A more elaborate
facility, Camp Delta, was quickly constructed for interrogation as the number of prisoners
multiplied; another facility, Camp Echo, would be constructed for client interviews after they
were authorized. Prison construction has continued with Camp Five, a super-maximum security prison for the most incorrigible and uncooperative and Camp Six, a barracks with communal conditions for minimal risk prisoners. A temporary facility for juveniles was also
provided.‖); see also Morris D. Davis, In Defense of Guantanamo Bay, 117 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 21 (2007).
21
Waterboarding—an interrogation technique that uses water to simulate drowning and
suffocation—has been around in various forms since the 1400s. After WWII, a military
commission convicted Japanese officer Yukio Asano for using waterboarding against a civilian. A U.S. soldier during the Vietnam War was court martialed after a Washington Post
photograph captured an image of a waterboarding interrogation. Texas Sheriff James Parker
was convicted in 1983 for waterboarding prisoners. Eric Weiner, Waterboarding: A Tortured
History, NPR (Nov. 3, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=158868
34.
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by U.S. officials.22 In fact, the U.S. practice of officially condoning limited
uses of torture, such as waterboarding, prior to 2005 provided a credible
foundation for the al-Qaeda lawfare tactic as it festered and ultimately exhibited signs of exponential growth to be exploited.23
Throughout the decade, countless purported terror suspects seized
on this as they continuously invoked the torture message as a means of attacking and shaping policy on the so-called War on Terrorism.24 By latching
onto the torture narrative through the confirmed instances of mistreatment,
and further taking this narrative onto the record in various legal forums, the
tactic served to irreparably harm the image of the United States, removed
the benefit of the doubt pertaining to government efforts to combat torture
allegations, and consequently the government‘s ability to effectively prosecute both a war and its accused war criminals.25 This, in turn, caused
changes in U.S. military tactics. One prime example became known in early
2010 where it was opined that the Obama administration was seeking to kill
potential al-Qaeda targets via aircraft and drones rather than capture them
for higher intelligence exploitation.26 That policy is cited as a direct response to the higher legal scrutiny derived from the many damaging torture
claims that continue to be made.27 In this regard, the lawfare tactic has gone
beyond being a mere courtroom sideshow. It has actually caused military
and intelligence operations to change in a manner historically reserved for
battlefield adaption pertaining to enemy combat activity.
A.

Tactical Lawfare

Captain C. Peter Dungan, an attorney attached to the U.S. Army‘s
3rd Special Forces Group, stated that the traditional concept of lawfare is
―like a computer virus or a hacker‘s denial of service attack on a network,
22

See Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, The Unholy Trinity: Intelligence, Interrogation
and Torture, 37 CASE. W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 427, 444 (2006); see also Leila Nadya Sadat,
Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37
CASE. W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 309, 340–41 (2006).
23
See Guiora, supra note 22, at 437–38.
24
Dungan, supra note 14, at 10; see also Al-Adahi, supra note 4.
25
See Sonni Efron, Prison Abuse Seen as Hurting U.S. Credibility, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/14/world/fg-rights14 (explaining that numerous
foreign governments latched onto the mistreatment narrative while human rights organizations called for legal action to ―restore U.S. moral authority.‖).
26
Government officials expressed concern about where to house and interrogate such
high-value individuals that could be effectively captured in light of the higher scrutiny and
impending closure of GTMO. Therefore, while killing these individuals got them off the
street, it robbed the government of valuable intelligence in regard to the terror operations.
See Karen Deyoung & Joby Warrick, Under Obama, more Targeted Killings than Captures
in Counterterrorism Efforts, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/13/AR2010021303748.html.
27
Id.
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[where] meritless suits seek to grind the wheels of justice to a halt.‖28 While
that analogy describes the effects of al-Qaeda‘s cumulative legal approach
into worldwide court systems, the concept of tactical lawfare goes a step
further. Tactical lawfare is the added notion of using legal and administrative systems to more directly shape the physical battlefield.29 For example,
detainees captured by indigenous forces in Iraq and Afghanistan often reportedly make a point to claim abuse at the point of capture.30 The same
detainees will then claim abuse when turned over to U.S. or allied forces,
and finally report additional abuse if they are retained in custody for pending legal action.31 What happens is that U.S. or allied forces are duty bound
per regulations and law to investigate all claims of abuse.32 Furthermore, the
burden of proof often is on the government when claims of torture or abuse
are levied. The result pertaining to the tactical lawfare concept is that multiple layers of resources and manpower relating to both front-line and support roles are diverted directly away from the battlefield in order to participate in the investigatory process.33 In short, the tactical lawfare approach of
waging cumulative abuse claims is just as effective as conventional physical
attacks in removing military/intelligence personnel and resources from the
battlefield.
But tactical lawfare is not limited to the area of combat operations.
As this cumulative approach of claiming abuse moves from the administrative regulations level and into the courts, a similar scenario plays out in
28

Dungan supra note 14, at 10.
The author in this current paper contends that tactical lawfare can be employed in a
much wider-ranging scope in terms of a universal and cumulative approach to using global
legal systems as a means to directly impact tactical and operational military endeavors. See
also Major John W. Bellflower, The Influence of Law on Command of Space, 65 A.F.L. REV.
107, 113 n.31 (2010) (The tactical level of war is defined as ―[t]he level of war at which
battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to
tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and
maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat
objectives.‖) (citing JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-02, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND
ASSOCIATED TERMS 534 (Mar. 17, 2009) available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_
pubs/jp1_02.pdf)) (Bellflower defines tactical lawfare in the context of an enemy taking
advantage of the Law of War, with the example being that of the enemy employing human
shields to avoid military action by those who abide by the Law of War.).
30
Dungan, supra note 14, at 10 (―Intercepted Taliban communications, captured documents, and interviews with jailhouse informants at theater-level facilities confirm that it has
become Taliban standard operating procedure to claim abuse every time a detainee moves
from one facility to the next. Usually, the claim is leveled during initial in-processing into the
field detention site or SOTF detention facility, either during the initial medical examination
or during the first interrogation.‖).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 13 (―When allegations of detainee abuse or violations of the rules of engagement,
or ROE, enter the OPCEN, the reputation and combat effectiveness of the task force are on
the line.‖).
29
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terms of using tactical lawfare to achieve the same results normally reserved
for traditional battlefield or diplomatic victories. This includes the ―paralyzing‖ of international intelligence services, releasing captured accused terror
operatives back into the fight, altering military operations, opting for targeted killings to avoid having to capture, and loss of ―operational momentum.‖34
B.

Faux Torture

But what about these torture claims? Certainly a significant number
are valid and have merit.35 However, the al-Qaeda tactic appears to take a
cumulative approach for maximum impact. This means that many torture
claims may not necessarily have merit.36 One example is former GTMO
prisoner named Muhammad Saad Iqbal Madni. This Pakistani national detailed extremely provocative claims of abuse to his Pakistani advocate as
part of lawsuit against the U.K. and Pakistani governments.37
Talking about the nature and degree of torture (Madni) alleges that
he was subjected to the third degree torture that included electric shocks to
the body, particularly the knees, kicks and slapping, falling tap water on the
head while blind-folded and hooded, a six month spell in a steel box measuring 6x4 feet in total nudity in extreme temperatures that could be absolutely chilling or humid. Was also kept hungry and thirsty.38
Madni‘s claims were certainly compelling. But the question remains
as to whether his provocative torture claims are true or if the claims were
merely part of a legal strategy in his effort to exert pressure on the Pakistani
and U.K. Governments to press for the release of al-Qaeda suspects remaining in GTMO. There is precedent for this tactic as other lawsuits filed by
family members of GTMO detainees within the Pakistani High Court work
34
DeYoung, supra note 26, at 1; Dunn, supra note 3, at 2; A DIA study reported that 14
percent of former GTMO detainees were confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorism.
DEF. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, FACT SHEET: FORMER GUANTANAMO DETAINEE TERRORISM
TRENDS (2009).
35
The government also has acknowledged waterboarding purported 9/11 mastermind
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and also top al-Qaeda associate Abu Zabaydah. See also Ali et al
v. Rumsfeld, Nos. 07–5178, 07–5185, 07–5186, 07–5187 (C.A.D.C. May 6, 2010) (Lawsuit
on behalf of various former GTMO detainees was dismissed due to lack of standing and
immunity of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, but the court acknowledged that it
believed torture had been conducted). See also Morris D. Davis, Historical Perspective on
Guantanamo Bay: The Arrival of the High Value Detainees, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L.
115, n.3 (2009).
36
Dungan supra note 14, at 10.
37
Syed M. Aslam, Freed Gitmo Inmate Narrates Horrific Plight, MAKEPAKISTANBETTER.
COM (last visited Sept. 25, 2010), http://makepakistanbetter.com/why_how_what_forum_full.
asp?ArticleID=10096&GroupID=5&Group_title=Pakistan; see also Madni v. Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Royal Courts of Justice (2009).
38
Madni, supra note 37.
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to achieve the same goal.39 For example, the wife of GTMO detainee Saifullah Paracha successfully convinced the High Court into forcing the Pakistani Government into providing quarterly reports on its progress of pushing
for the release of Pakistani detainees.40 The lawsuit also forced the Pakistani
Government to compensate families of GTMO detainees.41 In her highly
publicized lawsuit, the wife also invoked claims that Paracha was subjected
to harsh treatment despite the fact that unclassified evidence suggests that
Paracha has been consistently treated well.42 Regardless, in 2010, the Pakistani Government was deemed by the court to be in contempt for failing to
adequately press for the release of Pakistani citizens that were detained at
GTMO.43
But again, the question remains as to the veracity of these torture
claims. In his lawsuit, Madni invokes very detailed instances of torture and
mistreatment.44 His advocate even states that ―he was incarcerated near the
cages that Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, Saifullah Paracha, Dr. Ammar Balouch, an ex-husband of Dr. Afia Siddiqui, Majid Khan, Ghulam Rabbani
and Ghulam Raheem Rabbani, brothers who belong to Karachi was kept in
Guantanamo Bay.‖45 Madni then went on to quote the doctors, whom he
claims stated that the detainees were viewed as the enemy.46
The problem with Madni‘s story is that his account—widely publicized in Pakistan—is not true. A tour through the various camps at GTMO
revealed that none of the prisoners were kept in cages.47 In fact, the cages
were limited to a brief timeframe in 2002 that were highlighted in the
aforementioned leaked photos. Most of the names Madni invoked had not
39
Paracha v. Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, (2003) Const. P. 926/2003 (D.B.)
Principal Seat Karachi (Pak.).
40
Id.; See also SHC Directs Constitution of Medical Board: Medical treatment of Guantanamo Bay Detainee‟s Wife, APNAKARACHI.COM (Jun. 2, 2010), http://www.apnakarachi.
com/SHC-directs-constitution-of-medical-board.html.
41
Id.
42
See also SAIFULLA PARACHA DETAINEE 1094 TAKE ACTION!!!!, FREEPARACHAS.ORG
http://web.archive.org/web/20080219151328/http://www.freeparachas.org/ (accessed by
searching for www.freeparachas.org in the Internet Archive index). . This Web site is run by
the family of Saifullah and Uzair Paracha and mirrors many of the complaints found in the
lawsuit. Most notable is that as of July 11, 2010, the Web site erroneously stated that Saifullah Paracha ―has suffered 2 heart attacks due to extremely harsh interrogations and torture.‖
Unclassified documentation of FBI interviews with Saifullah Paracha reveal a less provocative picture of the situation.
43
Tariq Siddiqui, Remand Home shifted to Civil Defence building, DAWN (Pakistan), June
2, 2010, available at http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn
the-newspaper/local/remand-home-shifted-to-civil-defence-building-260.
44
Aslam, supra note 37; Madni, supra note 37.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Statement based on author‘s multiple tours to GTMO, as well as access gleaned from
position as prosecutor with the Office of Military Commissions.

File: Lebowitz 2

366

Created on: 1/9/2011 9:48:00 PM

Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:09:00 PM

CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L.

[Vol. 43:357

even been captured while the GTMO cages were briefly in use. Instead,
these detainees live in climate-controlled cells that include beds and personal effects.48 In addition, detainees have significant access to recreation yards
and classrooms, and many detainees live in a communal setting where they
can roam and interact within the camp confines for most of the day. 49 Moreover, unclassified records indicate that Paracha and the Rabbani brothers
have always been in completely different camps than Muhammad, Khan,
and Ammar—so called High-Value Detainees (HVD)—consequently making it highly unlikely Madni was incarcerated amongst that select group of
Pakistanis.50 And, as a non-HVD, Madni would not have been housed or
granted access to that camp, which is separated from the rest.51
C.

The Torture Benchmark

Madni is not the only prisoner to make such detailed accounts of
torture. Some claims of abuse by U.S. personnel have indeed been corroborated, while the veracity of others remains murky at best.52 But the effects of
even claiming torture per the al-Qaeda manual guidance resulted in significant legal and public relations victories for the terrorist organization and its
supporters.53 In addition, significant time and resources are required to investigate and possibly fend off even the murkiest of mistreatment claims,
which again constitute victories for al-Qaeda.54 In fact, these legal actions
often are just as tactically successful in terms of disrupting intelligence operations as more conventional battlefield or terror operations.55 At the same
time, the tactical gains of this lawfare approach serve to spin the public
48
Brown, supra note 19, at 8–11 (Brown presents a detailed listing of GTMO amenities
by camp.).
49
Id.
50
Andrew O. Selsky, AP: Military Confirms Secret Lockup for Top Detainees Inside
Guantanamo, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 6, 2008, available at Westlaw2/6/08 AP Worldstream
21:36:58 (The HVDs were placed in their own top secret camp upon arrival at GTMO and
have been segregated from the rest of the detainee population. The HVD camp is so top
secret that many top GTMO commanders are not told of its location and very few details
have been released.).
51
Id.
52
Dungan, supra note 14, at 10; Al-Adahi, supra note 4, at *9 (The U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals stated under the context of torture claims, ―Put bluntly, the instructions to detainees
are to make up a story and lie.‖); See also Davis, supra note 20, at 2 (GTMO detainee David
Hicks, his family, and attorneys constantly blitzed the media on claims of torture and abuse.
However, once his case was brought to a military commission, Hicks stipulated through his
attorney that no mistreatment took place and also thanked U.S. service members for the way
he was treated.).
53
Yin, supra note 2, at 879–83.
54
Id.; See generally ARMY REGULATION 15–6: INVESTIGATION INTO FBI ALLEGATIONS OF
DETAINEE ABUSE AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA DETENTION FACILITY (June 9, 2005), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2005/d20050714report.pdf.
55
Dunn, supra note 3, at 2.
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backlash toward western governments as opposed to historic revulsion pertaining to bloody terrorist attacks.56 And, all of the time and resources used
to litigate the torture or mistreatment claims ultimately have caused a wearing down on the American and British public, which in turn empowers alQaeda and its allies to hang on and continue the fight.57 The tactical lawfare
result also has proven to wear down individual military forces deployed to
the battlefield at all levels of hierarchy due to the heightened oversight and
seemingly never-ending investigatory process.58 As such, operational efficiency and momentum in physically fighting against terrorist organizations
is stunted.59 Much of this has been accomplished by ingratiating torture
claims into virtually all legal proceedings regardless of validity, as the examples of Madni and Paracha demonstrate.
Paul Rester is the director of GTMO‘s Joint Intelligence Group that
oversees the detainee camps and its interrogators.60 Rester is a known advocate for non-coercive interrogation techniques since assuming his position
in 2006.61 Rester confirmed that two instances of excessive harsh treatment
occurred at GTMO in the early days of the detainee camp.62 One of those
instances related to a Saudi detainee named Mohamed al Qahtani, a man
purported to be the 20th hijacker during the 9/11 attacks.63 Leaked information and a subsequent investigation suggests that al Qahtani was forced into
nudity, sleep deprived, faced a variety of verbal threats, and was even
forced to succumb to enemas.64
Al Qahtani made his claims of torture in 2005 around the time that
he was charged within the military commissions system. What happened as
a result was a significant legal victory for al Qahtani. Because of the torture
allegations, Susan Crawford, the convening authority of the Military Com-

56

Id.
But see Crabtree, supra note 11.
58
Dungan, supra note 14, at 10.
59
Id.
60
Terry Moran, Exclusive: Guantanamo‟s Chief Interrogator Says „We Don‟t Employ
Torture‘ (ABC News television broadcast June 26, 2006), available at http://abcnews.go.
com/Nightline/story?id=2123335&page=1.
61
Andrew O. Selsky, Gitmo Interrogator Describes Tactics, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 16,
2008, available at Westlaw 2/16/08 APONLINELAMCARB 20:51:39.
62
Moran, supra note 60.
63
Id.
64
See generally Arthur J. Lachman, The Torture Memos and the Demands for Legality, in
Volume XII, PLI‘S CALIFORNIA MCLE MARATHON 2009: LATEST ISSUES IN LEGAL ETHICS –
SUBSTANCE ABUSE – ELIMINATION OF BIAS IN THE PROFESSION 107-123 (2009); See also
Interrogation Log Detainee 063, available at http://www.time.com/time/2006/log/log.pdf
(purportedly obtained by TIME Magazine from the Department of Defense).
57
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missions, ordered that all charges be dropped against al Qahtani.65 The rationale was that his case was tainted beyond repair.66 In fact, Crawford specifically acknowledged that the harsh treatment of al Qahtani was to be construed as ―torture.‖67 As such, despite strong evidence against al Qahtani,
prospects for reintroducing charges against him languished well into the
second decade of the 21st Century.
This legal victory, coupled with the unrelated Abu Ghraib prisoner
abuse scandal in Iraq, cascaded into the perception that GTMO was the
home to countless similar activities.68 That perception in turn offers credibility to al-Qaeda propaganda measures, as well as efforts by individuals
such as Madni, to claim meritless torture in order to achieve their goals. In a
news interview, Rester confirmed as much when he told the Associated
Press that most of the stories of GTMO detainee abuse are directly derived
from the success of al Qahtani and the other unnamed individual.69
Upon being charged in a Military Commission, Muhammad Jawad,
the Afghani charged with attacking the U.S. Army convoy when he was
approximately seventeen years old, is another who described threats made
against him, although his claims related to instances at the point of capture.70 The military judge in Jawad‘s case agreed to suppress admissions
made to U.S. forces due to his treatment at the hands of Afghan troops prior
to being turned over to U.S. custody.71 Jawad has since been released. Omar
Khadr, fifteen at the time of capture, is another example of someone who
detailed torture claims upon being charged in a Military Commission.
Meanwhile, Uzair Paracha, the son of GTMO detainee Saifullah Paracha
who was implicated in the same conspiracy as his father, initially cooperated with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to include making
proffer statements and authorizing consent searches.72 But, upon the prospect of a criminal conviction in federal court, Uzair claimed that he was
mistreated by the FBI. Uzair was eventually convicted of terror-related
charges and sentenced to thirty years in prison. Although Uzair‘s mistreatment claims were rejected at the appellate level, Uzair‘s advocates in the
United States and abroad continue to press for his release based on those
65
Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at
A01 (Crawford stated ―we tortured Qahtani. His treatment met the legal definition of torture
and that‘s why I did not refer the case.‖).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
GTMO also became synonymous with waterboarding, despite the fact that the waterboarding activity occurred elsewhere and specifically not at GTMO.
69
Selsky, supra note 61.
70
Jawad, supra note 7.
71
Id.; Carol Rosenberg, Young Afghan freed; spent 61/2 years at Guantánamo, MIAMI
HERALD, August 24, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 16485195.
72
US v. Paracha, 2008 WL 2477392 (N.Y. 2008).

File: Lebowitz 2

2010]

Created on: 1/9/2011 9:48:00 PM

Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:09:00 PM

THE VALUE OF CLAIMING TORTURE

369

claims. A similar tactic was employed by Syed Hashmi, a U.S. citizen who
in 2010 received fifteen years in prison for attempting to secure equipment
for al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. During a rant against U.S. foreign policy,
Hashmi added—in what can almost be construed as an afterthought—the
unsubstantiated notion that his pre-trial treatment was physically ―cruel.‖73
D.

Legal Advice, Courtesy of al-Qaeda, Esq.

The commonality of all of these claims is that they follow the accepted al-Qaeda manual for handling a trial.74 This manual has 18 chapters
that range from waging terrorist attacks to enduring torture.75 Chapter 18 of
the manual details a set list of rules.76 The chapters regarding custody opine
that torture should be claimed no matter what.77
Rule number one advises ―at the beginning of the trial, once more
the brothers must insist on proving that torture was inflicted on them by the
State Security [investigators] before the judge.‖78 The second rule is to
―complain [to the court] of mistreatment while in prison.‖79 From there, the
manual advises a litany of items, which include that the prisoner ―do his
best to know the names of the state security officers, who participated in his
torture and mention their names to the judge.‖80
The tactic of seeking to identify state security officers is perhaps
one of the savviest elements of the al-Qaeda handbook. This is because
―outing‖ an intelligence officer is regarded as a major national intelligence
concern and causes many sleepless nights within the intelligence community.81 A secondary effect is that such identifications, or even allegations of
73

See Benjamin Weiser, Courtroom Tirade Offers Insight Into Mind of Would-Be Times
Sq. Bomber, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2010, at A21.
74
See The al Qaeda Manual, supra note 1.
75
Id.
76
Id. at Lesson 18.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
CIA Director Leon E. Panetta declared in 2010 that disclosure of such information
would result in ―exceptionally grave damage to clandestine human intelligence collection
and foreign liaison relationships.‖ American Civil Liberties Union v. Department of Defense
et al, 2010 WL 308810 (S.D.N.Y.); see also NYC Judge Rejects Release of CIA Materials to
ACLU, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 15, 2010, available at http://dailycaller.com/2010/07/15/nyjudge-rejects-release-of-cia-materials-to-aclu/ ( ―Courts are not invested with the competence
to second-guess the CIA director regarding the appropriateness of any particular intelligence
source or method‖); Lesley Clark, Pentagon Allows Banned Reporter to Return to Guantanamo, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, July 8, 2010, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/07/08/97
219/pentagon-allows-banned-reporter.html (JTF-GTMO also temporarily banned reporters
from the base after they reported the names of certain interrogators that had been classified,
even though those names were published elsewhere).
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implication, cause significant embarrassment to a wide variety of governments.82 This has proven on numerous occasions to create division among
allies in what has been known as the ―War on Terror.‖83 That division has in
turn granted victories for the detainees and their supporters that exist well
beyond mere legal procedure.84 In other words, it demonstrates how tactical
lawfare can shape the battlefield for asymmetrical actors such as al-Qaeda.
One example is the curious case of Mamdouh Habib. Habib is an
Australian citizen who was born in Egypt.85 He was arrested in Pakistan on
charges of assisting al-Qaeda in various activities, which include training
for some of the 9/11 hijackers.86 Habib ultimately was sent to GTMO.87
During the course of administrative proceedings, Habib claimed numerous
graphic accounts of torture that he said occurred during overseas incarceration prior to finding himself in U.S. military custody.88 The most striking
allegation charged that Australian and American personnel were on-hand
during the torture.89 While certainly not a new allegation, Habib‘s allegations stood out due to his level of detail relating to Australian intelligence
officer involvement.90 Habib further initiated a row between the United
States and Australia when he added that there also were individuals involved with American accents.91
Habib was ultimately released from GTMO, and Australia‘s attitude
toward GTMO became irreparably damaged and likely became a precursor
82
Dominic Casciani & Steve Swann, Guantanamo Papers: The UK‟s Handling of Detainees, BBC NEWS, July 15, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10641330 (In the United
Kingdom, about 80 government lawyers sifted through more than 500,000 documents located in a secure area in order to respond to lawsuits and inquiries relating to detainee issues
in conjunction with the United States).
83
H.X.A. v. The Home Office, [2010] EWHC 1177 (QB).
84
Id. (The division among allies causes less participation and consequently less coordinated manpower to be directed at specific targets or operations).
85
86

Habib v. Nationwide News Pty Ltd, [2010] NSWCA 34 (Austl.).

Id.
Id.
88
See Declaration of Teresa A. McPalmer, Habib v. Bush, (No. 02-CV-1130);
COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SUMMARY OF BASIS FOR
TRIBUNAL DECISION (Sept. 27, 2004), available at http://wid.ap.org/documents/detainees/
mamdouhhabib.pdf#16.
89
Id.; see also Dana Priest, Terror Suspect Alleges Torture, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2005, at
A1.
90
Documents Reveal Habib‟s Torture Allegations, ABC NEWS AUSTL., January 6, 2005,
available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200501/s1277343.htm (last visited on
Sept. 25, 2010) (―The Australian officials stood by while what we believe were CIA officials
engaged in the type of abuses we‘ve seen at Abu Graib, where Mamdouh Habib‘s clothes
were cut off, he‘s handcuffed, held down with women around him,‖ Habib‘s Australian
attorney told the media. ―The photos were taken and he was mocked.‖).
91
Id., See also Dana Priest, Terror Suspect Alleges Torture, WASH POST at A1, Jan. 6,
2005.
87

File: Lebowitz 2

2010]

Created on: 1/9/2011 9:48:00 PM

Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:09:00 PM

THE VALUE OF CLAIMING TORTURE

371

to a later military commissions case where Australia pressured U.S. officials
into releasing another Australian terror suspect named David Hicks.92 Such
―on-the-record‖ accusations also changed the nature of allied cooperation
between the United States and the United Kingdom as U.K. officials began
outright refusing to transfer terror suspects into U.S. custody out of fear that
suspects would ―be subject to extraordinary rendition to Guantanamo Bay.‖
93
Meanwhile, the allegations coming from Habib continued to endure well
into 2010 as Habib became embroiled in a libel and defamation lawsuit over
his statements. An Australian court initially found that Habib was exaggerating his torture claims. An appellate court later overturned the previous
ruling.94
The guidance pertaining to identifying these ―state security officers,‖ incidentally, also has resulted in a veritable cloak-and-dagger dynamic
between detainee advocates and the intelligence community.95 Reports have
quietly arisen of detainee advocates conducting their own investigations in
order to glean the identities of the interrogators to use in both criminal trial
and habeas corpus litigation.96 Because this tactic runs completely contrary
to intelligence community policy, an environment of distrust was increasingly cultivated.97 In one instance, a JTF-GTMO attorney affiliated with

92
Raymond Bonner, Australian Terrorism Detainee Leaves Prison, N.Y. TIMES, December 29, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/29/world/asia/29hicks.html?_r=
1&ref=david_hicks (Shortly after the publicized details of Habib‘s case, Australian Prime
Minister John Howard began facing significant domestic pressure to push for the release of
Hicks. Howard raised the issue directly with U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, and a plea
bargain securing Hicks‘ repatriation quickly followed).
93
See generally H.X.A. v. The Home Office, [2010] EWHC 1177 (QB) (Court documents
revealed that the U.K. government, in 2005, ceased all transfers of terror suspects to the
United States until a memorandum of understanding could be reached whereas the detainees
would be assured of humane treatment by the United States and specifically not transferred
to GTMO).
94
See Habib v. Nationwide News Pty Ltd, [2010] NSWCA 34 (Austl.).
95
Peter Finn, Detainees Shown CIA Officers‟ Photos, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2009, at A1
(detailing a federal investigation that began in 2009 relating to the ―John Adams Project.‖
This project involved researchers from the ACLU and National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers who conducted a private investigation into various covert and non-covert
CIA personnel involved in detainee cases. The researchers reportedly managed to identify
some of these covert personnel and took photographs of them. These photographs were then
reportedly brought to GTMO via defense counsel and shown to the detainees); Charlie Savage, Inquiry Into Whether Detainees Were Shown Photos of C.I.A. Agents, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2009, at A20 (investigating reportedly included three military defense attorneys,
who were read their rights prior to responding to the investigation).
96
Finn supra note 95; Savage supra note 95. See also Bill Gertz, Pentagon to Brief 2
Lawmakers on CIA Risk, WASH. TIMES, April 12, 2010, at A1.
97
See generally Marc Thiessen, Investigating the John Adams Project — It‟s About Time,
The Journal of the American Enterprise Institute, May 27, 2010, available at
http://blog.american.com/?p=14632 (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (For example, Rep. Jeff
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the Center for Constitutional Rights, disclosed then-secret information and
names to the advocacy group by containing the coded information within a
Valentine‘s Day card.98 The boiling point may have occurred in 2010 when
a Congressional budget committee proposed funding for investigating ethics
violations that may have been committed by detainee defense counsel.99 A
major factor for proposing this controversial policy was directly rooted in
the alleged campaign to follow the al-Qaeda guidance on prisoners doing
―his best to know the names of the state security officers.‖100
Practically, however, from the government‘s perspective, it employs more traditional national security litigation techniques. In the Military
Commissions, for example, government agencies, in conjunction with prosecutors, frequently file what are known as Rule 505 motions specifically
designed to protect the identity of the interrogators.101 This motion allows
for the use of pseudonyms and other identity safeguards.102 In fact, Rule 505
motions are the government‘s direct legal response to the lawfare tactic of
trying to ―out‖ interrogator identities.103 Government justification relates to
safety and liability concerns for the interrogators, as well as parallel national
security protections.104 While Rule 505 is similar to its federal court counterpart relating to national security protections, the military commissions
structure of limiting discovery to material and exculpatory facts as opposed
to typical open discovery does offer some increased leeway in protecting
interrogator identities as well as national security.105 This is in part because
it prevents discovery from going off on needless tangents while limiting
―fishing expeditions‖ relating to the discovery process.106 Meanwhile, other
countries, such as the United Kingdom, are beginning to develop a system

Miller (R-FL) referred to the alleged John Adams Project activities as ―devious‖ and ―illegal.‖ Meanwhile, others decried efforts to investigate as ―McCarthyite‖).
98
U.S. v. Diaz, No. 09-0535/NA (C.A.A.F. 2010), available at http://www.armfor.
uscourts.gov/opinions/2009SepTerm/09-0535.pdf (upholding conviction of a Navy Lt.
Commander who used his staff attorney position to reveal names of all detainees being held
at GTMO).
99
Charlie Savage, Bill Puts Scrutiny on Detainees‟ Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2010,
at A19 (propose a bill to direct the Pentagon‘s Inspector General to investigate suspected
misconduct of detainee defense attorneys).
100
See The Al Qaeda Manual at 176–80, supra note 1.
101
MIL. COMM‘N. R. EVID. 505.
102
Id.
103
Id.; See also Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. App. III, § 1-16 (2010)
(the statutory equivalent of MIL. COMM‘N. R. EVID. 505).
104
MIL. COMM‘N. R. EVID. 505; Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. App. III,
§ 1-16 (2010).
105
See U.S. DEP‘T. OF DEF., supra note 15.
106
Id.
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where they address the mistreatment allegations while further protecting the
source of the evidence.107
The al-Qaeda guidebook continues with items such as rule number
six, which includes established Western court items such as ―during the
trial, the court has to be notified of any mistreatment of the brothers inside
the prison.‖108 The practical approach of this al-Qaeda guidance is that detainees with legitimate claims of torture will have a step-by-step instruction
into ensuring their claims are properly addressed in court.109 At a minimum,
the guidebook authors were savvy enough in their tactical lawfare strategy
to note that valuable time and resources will be committed toward investigating claims of mistreatment, which certainly become cumulative in terms
of strategic impact.110 So, the tactic of claiming torture in all cases regardless of merit has developed into a formidable tactical lawfare strategy due to
the tactical inhibitions imposed onto various intelligence services and military means at all levels of operation.111
The al Qahtani case is a prime example of how the contents of the
manual reaped dividends in a legitimate torture issue. Once al Qahtani was
charged and afforded defense counsel, the torture complaints were investigated and filed in extensive detail and he ultimately prevailed in court.112
And for other detainees with more murky claims, chapter 17 of the manual
suggests that detainees ―give torture examples from Egypt, Syria, Jordan,
Saudi Arabia and all other Arab countries‖ where torture is notoriously
brutal.113 The allegations on behalf of Paracha and Madni, as well as Ahmed
Abu Omar Ali, are examples of these stereotypical claims.114
Another example is that of Ahmed Ould Abdel Aziz, a Mauritanian
citizen accused by the United States of fighting for the Taliban and alQaeda.115 According to JTF-GTMO logs, Abdel Aziz levied claims of ―excessive use of force.‖116 However, GTMO medical records and logs are
exceptionally detailed, even for those related to such valid torture victims as
107

See Richard Norton-Taylor et al., Government to Compensate Torture Victims as Official Inquiry Launched, THE GUARDIAN, July 6, 2010, at 1(noting that in July 2010, the recently elected British Prime Minister David Cameron announced a plan that would initiate an
official judicial inquiry into the torture claims via secure judicial officers while at the same
time preventing the disclosure of vital intelligence assets).
108
See The Al Qaeda Manual at 176–80, supra note 1, at Lesson 18.
109
Id.
110
See Yin, supra note 2, at 881–82.
111
See Dungan, supra note 14, at 10.
112
See ARMY REGULATION 15–6, supra note 54.
113
See The Al Qaeda Manual, supra note 1, Lesson 17.
114
See Paracha, supra note 8; Abu Ali, supra note 8, at 232-40; Madni, supra note 37.
115
CSRT Record of Proceedings, Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision, (Nov. 1, 2004).
116
GTMO records for ISN 757, WEBCITATION.ORG, at 8, http://www.webcitation.org/
query?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.defenselink.mil%2Fpubs%2Fpdfs%2FApp4.pdf&date=2
009-06-01 (last visited Sept. 25, 2010).
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al Qahtani.117 Medical issues and complaints are often recorded on a daily
and sometimes hourly basis.118 In addition, these records have always been
discoverable during military commissions proceedings and investigations.
When the only ―proof‖ of torture that Abdel Aziz could muster was a bandage on his thigh, an investigation determined that the claims were ―unsubstantiated.‖119 Subsequent claims of torture against Abdel Aziz were also
investigated and debunked, which is in stark contrast to al Qahtani‘s investigation and confirmation of mistreatment.
The success of al Qahtani, as well as the knowledge of waterboarding activities, perpetuated a significant effort to cloud all relevant legal proceedings with torture claims.120 This effort was not limited to al-Qaeda
operatives, but also humanitarian advocates and defense attorneys who
would advise their clients to make such torture claims as a practical matter.
Soon, documents similar to portions of the Manchester Manual were popping up inside detainee cells.121 One of the more overt examples includes an
Amnesty International brochure that was covertly hidden from screeners by
being included among protected attorney-client correspondence.122 That
brochure included the Camp X-Ray photos and essentially directed detainees to claim torture due to the brochure‘s assertion that Americans were
waging a torture campaign against Muslims.123 Such instances then led to
additional legal battles relating to the attorneys who assisted in distributing
contraband brochures or violating secrecy orders, which further highlighted
the torture issue while also providing an additional battlefront over the
rights to counsel.124

117

See Id.
See Id.
119
Id. at 7.
120
See Selsky, supra note 61.
121
See Debra Burlingame & Thomas Joscelyn, Gitmo‟s Indefensible Lawyers, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 15, 2010, , at A23 (discussing that interviews conducted with JTF-GTMO personnel
revealed similar concerns; at GTMO, attorney-client privilege is respected and consequently,
legal material that is brought into such attorney-client meetings is not reviewed by outside
personnel); See DEP‘T OF DEF., CAMP DELTA STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES, sec. II –
Operations, 24-6, at 13.1 (2003).(distinguishing legal mail from other forms of mail); Jane
Sutton, Mystery Underwear Stymies Guantanamo Investigators, REUTERS,Oct. 18, 2007,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSNASUA170120071018 (discussing another
investigation revolving around detainee legal counsel related to smuggled underwear and
swimsuits, which elicited some snickers but also concern relating to potential use as means
for committing suicide).
122
Burlingame & Joscelyn, supra note 121.
123
Id.
124
See Diaz, supra note 98, at 5–7.
118
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III. MILITARY COMMISSIONS CIRCA 2010
When Obama was sworn in as President in January 2009, the efforts
to prosecute accused terrorists were at a crossroads. The Detainee Treatment
Act had already become law, consequently limiting detainee interrogations
and treatment to the relatively benign articulation of the U.S. Army Field
Manual.125 This means waterboarding was officially illegal, as was anything
even close to resembling the treatment described and later confirmed to
have been committed against al Qahtani.126 But, debate continued to rage
over the proper venue to prosecute what was then referred to as unlawful
enemy combatants. Many in the U.S. Government preferred to use the federal justice system to prosecute these detainees. They cited numerous successes in gaining convictions. Others argued that the military commissions
were the proper venue, often citing the fact that military commissions have
been used in war crimes cases since the American Revolution, and virtually
all major wars since.127 An important compromise was enacted in October
2009, when the Military Commissions Act was revised.128 The 2009 version
was lauded in many circles for specifically banning the courtroom use of
virtually any information gleaned from torture, while still permitting the
venue to proceed.129 In that manner, government officials such as Attorney
125

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 10 U.S.C. § 801-1002(a) (2005) [hereinafter DTA]
(stating that ―no person in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of
Defense or under detention in a Department of Defense facility shall be subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in the United States Army
Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.‖); see also Provision of Military Commissions
Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (serving to make the Detainee Treatment Act the exclusive ―action‖ for alien detainees, who have been determined to have been properly detained
as enemy combatants or are awaiting such determination, does not abridge remedial powers
of the Court of Appeals); Belbacha v. Bush 520 F.3d 452, 454–56 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 552 U.S. 1033 (2007).
126
See DTA, supra note 125.
127
See Marguerite Feitlowitz, Introduction to Prosecuting Al Qaeda: September 11 and its
Aftermath, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT (Dec. 26, 2001), http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/
alqaeda-intro.html (stating that military commissions have been used by numerous presidents, to include George Washington, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D.
Roosevelt).
128
See Military Commissions Act of 2009, supra note 15.
129
See Warren Richey, Obama Endorses Military Commissions for Guantanamo Detainees, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 29, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2009/
1029/p02s01-usju.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010); see also David Frakt, New Manual for
Military Commissions Disregards Commander-in-Chief, Congressional Intent and the Laws
of War, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 29, 2010, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
david-frakt/new-manual-for-military-c_b_557720.html (Frakt, a former lead defense counsel
in the military commissions system, acknowledges that ―on the whole, the 2009 MCA is
substantially fairer than the 2006 version of the law and the new Manual also contains some
significant improvement over the previous version. The standards for admissibility of
coerced statements and hearsay evidence, for example, now are much closer to the standards
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General Eric Holder could initiate the prosecution of detainees accused of
participation in the 9/11 attacks. Meanwhile, it would also allow a military
commission to convene in the prosecution of more classic alleged war criminals such as Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, a detainee accused of masterminding
the deadly 2000 maritime attack on the U.S.S. Cole.130
A.

Reconciling the National Security Dynamic with Legal Proceedings

Although the general phrase of ―protecting national security assets‖
is often cited as the justification for having military commissions, the true
and related utility is providing a venue that permits the use of unwarned, unMirandized statements.131 This means that intelligence agencies, such as the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), can use interrogations to glean information relating to terrorist cells and infrastructure. These interrogation statements can then be theoretically introduced for both inculpatory and exculpatory use in a military commission prosecution.132 Agencies such as the CIA
and NSA are historically intelligence-gathering organizations, as opposed to
law enforcement groups such as the FBI and the Criminal Investigation
Task Force (CITF). As a result, the military commissions process allows the
CIA to focus on national security while not voiding the prospects of seeking
a conviction in either federal court or via military commission. A successful
example in terms of intelligence value and necessity is the immediate interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, which open source information
reveals led to the capture and ultimate federal court convictions of Iyman
Faris (relating to a plot against New York City bridges), Jose Padilla (purported ―dirty bomber‖), Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri (purported al-Qaeda
sleeper agent), and Uzair Paracha, as well as the detention and pending military commission trials of Majid Khan (accused of plotting to attack U.S. gas
stations), and Saifullah Paracha.133
which apply in general courts-martial and federal court.‖ However, Frakt states that there are
―some very troubling language in the new Manual relating to the proof required to convict
for certain offenses, which undermines the Obama Administration‘s claims of respect for the
law of war and adherence to the rule of law.‖).
130
See U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., MILITARY COMMISSIONS, ABD AL-RAHIM AL-NASHIRI, available
at http://www.defense.gov/news/commissionsalnashiri.html (select ―sworn charges‖) (last
visited Sept. 25, 2010).
131
See U.S. DEP‘T. OF DEF., supra note 15 at M.C.R.E. 304(a)(4).
132
Id.
133
Phil Hirschkorn, Lawyer: Detained Pakistani to Face Terrorism Charges, CNN.COM,
Aug. 6, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/08/04/alqaeda.suspect/ (discussing how the
interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad lead to the arrest of Uzair Paracha, Ali Saleh
Kahlah al-Marri, Majid Khan, and Saifullah Paracha); see also Thomas Joscelyn, KSM‟s
Sleeper Agents Posed a Serious Threat, WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM (Sept. 11, 2009),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/937zmvqs.asp
(discussing the many individuals named by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as being involved in
al Qaeda attacks in the United States).
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With the fixes and modifications to the military commissions rules
and mandate, these statements are only permitted for prosecution so long as
the circumstances of the treatment adhered to the U.S. Army Field Manual.134 As a result, Muhammad‘s statements would now not be admissible
because they were tainted by waterboarding. Muhammad‘s statements were
not used in the aforementioned legal proceedings.135 But, with the rules
enacted since 2005, any non-tainted information can be elicited for intelligence value and military commissions prosecution.136 This follows in line
with the military commissions structure where only information that is material, helpful or exculpatory to the defense is discoverable.137 That is in
contrast to traditional open discovery rules relating to providing opposing
counsel with anything that is relevant. Therefore, discovery does not need to
go off on a tangent, which protects extraneous national security assets. The
military commissions then can proceed with its additional protections of
―national security assets‖ as prescribed in the rules.
B.

Tackling Torture Issue through Improved Military Commissions
Act

The Rules for Military Commissions, which were approved by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in April 2010, provide guidelines for what
statements can be used during legal proceedings.138 As mentioned above,
anything gleaned contrary to the Army Field Manual is not admissible by
the government.139 Instead, the rules mandate that admissible statements be
134

See 42 U.S.C § 801(a) (―In general. No person in the custody or under the effective
control of the Department of Defense or under detention in a Department of Defense facility
shall be subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in
the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.‖); see also Belbacha v.
Bush, 520 F.3d 458–459 (discussing the DTA‘s ability to limit the court‘s jurisdiction).
135
See 42 U.S.C § 801(a) (―In general. No person in the custody or under the effective
control of the Department of Defense or under detention in a Department of Defense facility
shall be subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in
the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.‖); see also Belbacha, 520
F.3d at 458–459 (discussing the DTA‘s ability to limit the court‘s jurisdiction); see also
Gregory S. McNeal, A Cup of Coffee after the Waterboard: Seemingly Voluntary Post-Abuse
Statements, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 943, 976 (2010) (discussing that statements found to be
involuntarily derived under torture are not admissible in court).
136
McNeal, supra note 135, at 976 (stating that any statement obtained through torture
after the enactment of the DTA in 2005 is inadmissible); see also United States v. Ghailani,
No. S10 98 Crim. 1023(LAK), 2010 WL 2756546, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2010) (holding that 6th Amendment rights were not violated against a former GTMO detainee because
the CIA and law enforcement had a national security interest in engaging in custodial interrogations over the course of several years).
137
U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15, at M.C.R.E. 701.
138
Id.
139
See 42 U.S.C § 801(a) (―In general. No person in the custody or under the effective
control of the Department of Defense or under detention in a Department of Defense facility
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deemed ―voluntary.‖140 Since Miranda warnings and signed consent statements are often replaced with uncomfortable rooms and shackles during
intelligence interrogations, the rules go on to discern what may be constituted as ―voluntary statements.‖141 For example, age, education, and otherwise sophistication are listed as circumstances to be taken into account under the totality of the circumstances when assessing the voluntariness of a
statement.142 Circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement also are
taken into account, as well as lapse of time and location between the statements sought for admission and any prior questioning.143 Was the individual
coerced in any way? Did the interrogator cross the line in terms of deceptiveness? All of these items are taken into account under the rules.144 This
means that Jawad, who was about seventeen at the time of his interrogations, or Khadr, who was fifteen, may have a stronger case of making involuntary statements than someone such as Saifullah Paracha who was in his
fifties, highly educated, and westernized. An additional result of this somewhat innocuous ―voluntary statement‖ guidance is that it likely will be contested in virtually every non-speedy trial military commission case.
But perhaps the most prominent change between the initial military
commissions rules and the 2010 revision relates specifically to claims of
torture.145 The old version prohibited the admission of torture-derived
statements.146 That antiquated version simply mandated that ―[a] statement
obtained by use of torture shall not be admitted into evidence against any
party or witness.‖147 However, that prohibition was often maligned because
many legal and political minds contended that activities such as waterboarding were not necessarily ―torture.‖148 Instead, methods such as waterboardshall be subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in
the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.‖); see also Belbacha v.
Bush, 520 F.3d at 458–459 (discussing the DTA‘s ability to limit the court‘s jurisdiction).
140
See U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15 at M.C.R.E. 304(a)(4).
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
See generally U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15, at M.C.R.E. 304.
145
See Habib v. Nationwide News Pty Ltd, [2010] NSWCA 34 (Austl.) (discussing
admissibility of testimony made under torture).
146
DEP‘T U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS 2006 at M.C.R.E.
304(a)(3).
147
Id.
148
See generally Ashcroft Defends Waterboarding Before House Panel, CNN.COM, July
17, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/17/ashcroft.waterboarding/ (Former
Attorney General John Ashcroft told Congress that ―I believe a report of waterboarding
would be serious, but I do not believe it would define torture.‖); see also Memorandum from
Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att‘y Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel on Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative for John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel of the Cent. Intelligence
Agency (Aug. 1, 2002) available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-bybee2002.pdf
(concluding that many interrogation methods do not constitute torture); see also Katherine
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ing, extreme sleep deprivation activities, and excessive temperature changes
were officially referred to under the innocuous term ―enhanced interrogation
techniques,‖ with the acronym EIT.149 The differentiation between EITs and
unquestionable torture became confused and intertwined.150 Citing early
Bush-era memos defending EITs, opponents of the military commissions
frequently attacked the military commissions rules as illegitimate and condoning of these EITs, since an argument could theoretically be made against
what exactly constituted torture. This argument persisted and further tarnished the image of the military commissions as a fair and transparent form
of justice. At the same time, the innocuous language of the earlier rules afforded organizations ranging from al-Qaeda to Amnesty International to
maintain the focus on torture.
In an effort to combat this line of attack, the Obama administration
ordered that new military commissions cases be halted until the rules could
be modified.151 As a result, the 2010 rules offered a much more specific
manifestation.152 MCRE 304(a)(1) was refined with the title ―Exclusion of
Statements Obtained by Torture or Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment.‖153 The modified rule went on to mandate that ―[no] statement, obtained by the use of torture, or by cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (as
defined by section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C.
2000dd)), whether or not under color of law, shall be admissible in a trial by
military commission.‖154 For the first time, the rules squarely defined the
parameters of ―torture,‖ with the Detainee Treatment Act serving as the
benchmark.155 This simple change caused frequent critics of the military
commissions to acknowledge, grudgingly, the improved nature of the
rules.156
The 2010 rules also became more specific in other ways. For example, the old rules had a general prohibition against statements made by the

Gallagher, Universal Jurisdiction in Practice: Efforts to Hold Donald Rumsfeld and Other
High-Level United States Officials Accountable for Torture, 7 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 1087,
1087 (2008) (describing how U.S. government memos offer legal support for various interrogation techniques, including waterboarding).
149
Gallagher, supra note 148, at 1094 (referring to enhanced interrogation techniques as
―EIT‖).
150
See Yin supra note 2 (offering different classifications of torture).
151
Peter Finn, Obama Seeks Halt to Legal Proceedings at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Jan.
21, 2009.
152
DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15.
153
Id. at pt. III, M.C.R.E. § 304(a)(1).
154
Id.
155
Compare id. (defining torture within the parameters of the Detainee Treatment Act),
with DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15,at § 304(a)(1) (2007) (offering a definition of torture that
is vastly less specific).
156
See Frakt, supra note 129.
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accused derived from coercion.157 The 2010 version of MCRE 304(a)(2)
now relates to ―other statements of the accused‖ and mandates that ―[a]
statement of the accused may be admitted in evidence in a military commission only if the military judge finds that the totality of the circumstances
renders the statement reliable and possessing sufficient probative value . . .
and that the statement was made incident to lawful conduct during military
operations at the point of capture or during closely related active combat
engagement, and the interests of justice would best be served by admission
of the statement into evidence; or the statement was voluntarily given.‖158
The genesis of this modification may very well be rooted in the abovementioned Jawad case. In that case, Jawad successfully argued for the suppression of his statements because they were made shortly after he was purportedly threatened by Afghan forces prior to being turned over to U.S. custody.159 The old rules were far from clear and left the door open for confusion and inconsistency among various judges. In contrast, the 2010 rules are
written in a more understandable and detailed manner that is closer to traditional military courts-martial and civilian legal code.
The 2010 update to MCRE 304(a)(3) offers similar changes when it
comes to ―statements from persons other than the accused.‖160 This update
also defines torture under the guidance of the Detainee Treatment Act.161
The practical effect of this element is that EITs such as waterboarding, that
may previously have been in dispute as to whether or not they constituted
legal torture, were outright prohibited from use against a different detainee.162 This means that confessions elicited from accused 9/11 mastermind
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad via waterboarding would unquestioningly be
prohibited for use against Muhammad‘s alleged co-conspirators.163
However, while the 2010 changes provide much more detailed
guidance when it comes to statements of the accused and persons other than
the accused, the rules do not completely close the door on statements from
such EIT recipients as Muhammad.164 If the government so chooses, it can
still make a compelling argument for the admission of statements obtained
years after the EIT process ceased.165 The government could conceivably
157

See DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15.
DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15, at M.C.R.E. § 304(a)(2).
159
Ruling on Def. Mot. To Suppress, at 1–3, United States v. Jawad (No. 08-004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/commissionsJawad.html.
160
DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15, at M.C.R.E. § 304(a)(3).
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
McNeal, supra note 135, at 977–78.
164
See generally DEP‘T OF DEF., supra note 15.
165
See United States v. Ghailani, 2010 WL 1839030, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2010) (denying a suppression motion on the grounds that Ghailani‘s treatment by the CIA bore no
logical relationship to his prosecution, particularly since the prosecutors had rejected the use
158
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argue that statements made to the FBI, CITF, or military investigators were
voluntary after the Detainee Treatment Act went into effect in 2005. This is
because many of the detainees had legal counsel by this time. Individuals
such as Muhammad would also fit the definition of an educated, older detainee.166 In addition, detainees such as Muhammad—or KSM as he is
known in the intelligence and law enforcement community—were no longer
forced to cooperate.167 Instead, waterboarding and other varying forms of
EITs were replaced with what some insiders referred to as ―cookieboarding.‖168 Rewards such as additional food, treats, entertainment, recreation,
and increased freedom to interact with fellow detainees were granted to
those who were deemed cooperative.169 This means that a detainee desiring
to eat a specialty New York style cheesecake or have an opportunity to play
numerous soccer games with fellow detainees would first need to behave
themselves and play ball with their questioners. Those who would not cooperate with their questioners would merely live in a more austere environment.
As such, many of these post-2005 statements continue to be recorded in what the FBI refers to as Letterhead Memorandums (LHMs). These
LHMs are summarizations of the interrogations and, in the context of Guantanamo Bay detainees, specifically relate to unwarned but otherwise voluntary interview sessions.170 In many cases, the detainee will cut an interview
short due to health concerns or general ―not feeling up to it.‖171 LHMs differ
from some of the early classified CIA summaries that delve into statements
made under EIT conditions. It should, however, be noted that countless CIA
interrogations since 2001 were conducted under the same degree of unprovocative and/or ―cookie boarding‖ tactics as the FBI, CITF, and military
of any statements by Ghailani from after his capture). A similar approach can be applied in a
military commission.
166
Muhammed is in his late 40s and received a college degree from North Carolina A&T
State University. Muhammad also experienced a brief period in a local North Carolina jail
relating to a car accident. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed‟s Isolated U.S. College Days, Dina
Temple-Raston (Nat‘l Pub. Radio broadcast Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=120516152.
167
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 10 U.S.C.A. § 801 (West 2010).
168
One publicized early example from 2001 relates to that of al Qaeda operative Abu Jandal who reportedly offered up a wealth of information relating to the 9/11 attacks after nearly
a year of antagonistic failure to cooperate. Jandal, a diabetic, reportedly opened up after
guards provided him with sugar-free cookies as an incentive item. The interrogator who used
the cookieboarding approach has become a harsh critic of the pre-DTA Bush-era interrogation practices. See Bobby Ghosh, After Waterboarding: How to Make Terrorists Talk?, TIME,
June 8, 2009, at 41, 41.
169
Id.; The author also has reviewed countless GTMO interrogation reports that detail the
sheer amount of rewards offered, accepted and refused by detainees.
170
The author has sifted through countless LHMs during the trial preparation phase of
cases held at GTMO. The content of many LHMs remain classified.
171
Id.
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investigations, although most of the CIA summaries remain classified due to
national security protections.172 So, in theory, these untainted statements,
particularly LHMs, could be classified as voluntary depending on the sophistication of the detainee along with other tangible circumstances. From a
practical point of view, the defense would still likely be able to seek the
introduction of earlier mistreatment in order to diminish the effects of the
later statements, but again, in theory, the LHMs could very well be considered ―voluntary‖ and consequently admissible under the 2010 rules.
Moreover, individuals, such as Muhammad, admitted under oath to
various war crimes during the yearly Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRT).173 These are administrative proceedings that are designed to determine whether a detainee should continue to be classified as an ―enemy
combatant,‖ a term that was changed in the MCA 2009 to ―unprivileged
enemy belligerent‖ and the legal basis for jurisdiction to hold a non-citizen
in detention.174 An argument can certainly be made that these admissions
were voluntary because they were made under both the CSRT oath and an
Islamic oath.175 In addition, attendance or participation in a CSRT is voluntary, with a personal representative assigned to assist the detainee if desired.176 Checklists and a script specifically inform the detainee that he is
not required to attend, but certainly may do so if desired. Detainees also are
asked if they want to make a statement.177 Muhammad, for example, prepared a pre-arranged statement that refuted some assertions but corroborated
others.178 For example, Muhammad admitted to his role in 9/11, as well as
other terrorist plots, while also asserting that he was not the leader of alQaeda‘s Military Committee as had been alleged at one time.179 So, again,
while the defense would likely seek to muddy the waters by introducing
previous EIT treatment to show how it correlates to the CSRT admission,
that statement also would in theory be deemed admissible as voluntary.

172

An in-depth article in the New York Times revealed that more than two-thirds of all
CIA interrogations conducted in the few years after 9/11 involved no element of coercion.
See Scott Shane, Inside a 9/11 Mastermind‟s Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, at
A1.
173
Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 17–
20 (Mar. 10, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/transcript_isn10024.pdf.
174
Davis, supra note 20.
175
McNeal, supra note 135, at 977 (discussing the totality of the circumstances test as an
analytical framework for determining the voluntariness of the statements).
176
Davis, supra note 20; see also Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing
for ISN 10024, supra note 173.
177
See also Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024, supra
note 173 (providing details of the CSRT Hearing).
178
Id.
179
Id. (Muhammad maintained that he was in fact the head of al-Qaeda‘s Media Committee, as well as head of the terror organization‘s anthrax program.).
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Despite the political affirmation of military commissions, the
process was still under the same torture claim attack in both legal and media
venues, with voluntariness of statements front and center. The first major
military commissions hearings to take place in 2010 revolved around defense efforts to suppress detainee statements due to alleged torture or otherwise harsh treatment.180 Interrogators were called to the stand where they
relayed, among other items, witness testimony that the detainee, who was
seriously injured in the 2002 firefight that led to his capture, was shackled
to a hospital bed while being interrogated.181 As a result, numerous advocacy and legal groups were provided additional ammunition to continue their
torture arguments.
Moreover, the torture and mistreatment argument was even used in
real-time while these suppression hearings were going on. At Guantanamo
Bay, detainees are held in various camps located about ten miles from the
courthouse. JTF-GTMO security rules require that detainees be frisked,
blindfolded, and have soundproof earmuffs placed on their heads as a van
transfers them to and from court. On the first day of suppression hearings,
the detainee, Omar Khadr, refused to attend the hearing because he objected
to these security precautions, arguing through his attorneys, that the transfer
van already had blacked out windows so such extreme security precautions
were merely designed to be humiliating.182 In addition, the detainee also
claimed that the guards violated him during the frisking process. 183 These
claims soon overshadowed the actual hearings. The next day of the hearings, the detainee again claimed mistreatment due to his contention that
being forced into blindfolds had caused immense pain to his eye that was
damaged in the 2002 firefight.184 This claim again overshadowed the hearings, despite the fact that the detainee was observed playing basketball with
other detainees later that evening.185
IV. PROPAGANDA V. REALITY
There is little doubt that accused al-Qaeda detainees and their advocates have succeeded in shaping the negative public and legal perceptions of
180

Steven Edwards, Khadr‟s Health Becomes Issue at U.S. Base Hearings, CANWEST
NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 29, 2010, http://www.canada.com/news/Khadr+health+becomes+
issue+base+hearings/2965681/story.html.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Michelle Shephard, At Omar Khadr Hearing, U.S. Officer Explains Changing Battle
Report, THE STAR, May 1, 2010, available at http://www.thestar.com/specialsections/
article/803378--at-omar-khadr-hearing-u-s-officer-explains-changing-battle-report.
184
Id.
185
Shephard, supra note 183 (―Military judge Col. Patrick Parrish ordered the proceedings
to continue over the objections of the defence, noting guards reported Khadr had played
basketball Friday night and was therefore fit enough to come to court.‖).
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GTMO. It is exceptionally common in both the United States and abroad to
equate detainee detention with torture, orange jumpsuits, and cages.186
Shaping the GTMO reputation and policy through lawfare tactics in and of
itself is a victory for those who constantly flood the legal and administrative
process with accusations of torture. Moreover, the cumulative approach to
using the torture narrative under the tactical lawfare concept also has directly affected operations on the battlefield.187 However, is it a victory for detainees that likely will remain incarcerated for many years to come?
A.

GTMO over Supermax: Life‟s a Beach

While much of the world views GTMO as a horror-filled prison, the
detainees know better. Individuals such as Ali al-Bahlul, who received a life
sentence in a 2008 military commission for assisting Usama bin Laden‘s
propaganda efforts, have many more freedoms at GTMO than they would in
federal prison.188 In fact, given the choice between the federal ―supermax‖
prison in Florence, Colorado or GTMO, a seeming majority of detainees
have indicated they would prefer to stay.189 ―They know that there will not
be the same privileges as [GTMO],‖ a detainee liaison recently said, ―Given
the choice of being sentenced forever in Guantanamo or moved to supermax, it is ‗no, can I stay at GTMO?‘ Here they can be outside, they can
smell the sea.‖190
The differences between federal prison, which is governed by federal law, and the Department of Defense-run GTMO prison camps, which
adhere to Geneva Conventions rules, is striking in terms of quality of life.191
The federal supermax prison is where many of the most notorious federally
convicted foreign terrorists reside.192 This includes those responsible for the
1994 World Trade Center bombing, as well as Uzair Paracha. Supermax
prisoners typically spend more than twenty-two hours a day locked within a
single nine-by-nine foot cell.193 Their only source of natural light is seen
through a skylight.194 Prisoners are not permitted to go outside.195 Exercise
186

See Andleeb Abbas, View: An Inconvenient Freedom, DAILY TIMES (PK), July 11, 2010,
available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C07%5C11%5Cstory_
11-7-2010_pg3_3 (Pakistani editorial writer and political consultant offers as fact an illinformed and factually incorrect legal assessment of Guantanamo Bay as ―a Gestapo-type
concentration camp in violation of all human rights laws and conventions‖).
187
Dungan, supra note 14; See also Bellflower, supra note 29 (noting that lawfare is a
variant of warfare).
188
United States v. al Bahlul (CMCR) (No. 09-001).
189
Spillius, supra note 16 (comparing GTMO to Supermax).
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
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is limited to about an hour a day during the week.196 Various reports indicate that many inmates suffer psychological trauma for what is described as
―severe isolation.‖197
In contrast, throughout GTMO‘s first decade, it has adapted to rules
typically required to prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions.198
These freedoms are even more extensive than the Miami incarceration of
ousted Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, who was treated as a prisoner
of war from 1990 to his extradition to France in 2010 and consequently had
among other items better food and was permitted to wear his military uniform.199 This means that even the most non-compliant GTMO detainees
have access to the outdoors. Food is diverse and caters to religious diets. 200
Food and water also often is the same as what the guards and military personnel eat. In some of the camps, detainees are free to come and go from
their rooms.201 One camp in particular includes a large soccer field that lies
in view of classrooms and recreation rooms.202 Another camp for less compliant detainees provides shaded and unshaded areas for detainees to exercise or converse with others.203 Even the high-value detainees often have
unfettered access to recreation, outdoors, and interaction among themselves.
Cable television, books and newspapers are prevalent, where news channels
such as al Jazzera are available for those who wish to watch. 204 ―The Twilight,‖ a series of books geared toward teens involving a vampire/werewolf
love triangle was reportedly particularly popular in early 2010.205 A typical
day in any of the camps revolves around detainees walking, talking, and
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often joking around amongst each other, as well as praying together.206 During the 2010 World Cup soccer tournament, GTMO officials arranged for
detainees to have unrestricted access to the televised coverage.207 Red Cross
officials or legal counsel often make their way into the camps and can be
seen conversing with detainees on any given day as well.208 Detainees also
have relatively frequent access to their families back home via ICRCsponsored video/telephone communications (VTC).209 According to internal
records, detainee complaints to camp personnel often relate to such mundane issues as the salt and pepper levels in the food. But, GTMO is still a
prison and is far from perfect. In 2009, a Pentagon review recommended
that high-value detainees have even more interaction amongst each other.210
And, controversies surrounding what some refer to as mind games between
GTMO personnel and detainees, as well as isolation, continue to exist.211
B.

Lawfare Tactic Backfires

But, again, how many of those stories are truly legitimate? The issues surrounding al Qahtani were certainly valid. But then there are items
such as Abdel Aziz‘s ―unsubstantiated‖ thigh issue.212 In addition, hunger
strikes often develop among the detainees. Speculation exist that these hunger strikes are not organized by the detainees themselves, but instead coordinated via the ―Detainee News Network (DNN).‖213 The goal of the hunger
strikes is speculated to force GTMO personnel to attempt to force feed the
detainees, thus providing some sort of recorded evidence to present in public cases of ―mistreatment.‖ Moreover, speculation exists where detainees
often make pre-determined plans among each other on when they will be
disobedient.214 This is because it is well known in the camps that if a detainee refuses to leave his cell, GTMO personnel will conduct what is referred
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to as a Forced Cell Extraction.215 These extractions, which are reportedly
often anticipated and directed by outside advocates, follow a detailed standard operating procedure and, more importantly to the defense, are recorded
and documented.216 In other words, these outside influences, knowing that
everything is documented, are seeking to use hunger strikes and forced cell
extractions to manufacture evidence to be used as ammunition in legal proceedings as well as public opinion.
However, perhaps the intended consequence of these actions was to
put pressure on the U.S. Government to close the GTMO detention facility
and transfer the detainees to U.S.-based prison facilities. Ultimately, the
tactic was always to cast GTMO in the most negative light in order to bring
down the entire wartime system of handling detainees. But, now that the
goal is close to being achieved, the lawfare strategy of using the legal system to force U.S. policy has been thrust in disarray as detainees begin to
rebel against their advocates to some degree. As the option of actually being
transferred became more real in 2009 as opposed to some far off goal, insiders and detainee attorneys both report that many detainees are starting to
become uneasy with a potential move.217 Detainees reportedly relish the fact
that they can enjoy the tropical environment and general liberties of GTMO
while still maintaining street credentials as their peers back home continue
to believe that they are suffering every day. At the same time, detainees
shudder at the thought of being transferred to some place such as northern
Illinois where they would have to remain indoors for much of the year.218
Moreover, Algerian detainees in 2010 demanded in federal court that they
be permitted to remain at GTMO rather than be repatriated to their home
country where they feared actual torture.219
Mark Falkoff, an attorney who represents numerous detainees ranging in citizenship from Yemen to Pakistan, acknowledged the increasingly
prevailing view in an early 2010 interview.220 Falkoff told Newsweek Magazine that while his clients clearly want to go home, they are at least being
held under Geneva Convention conditions at GTMO.221 A transfer to a place
215
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such as Illinois, Falkoff continued, would equate to throwing the detainees
into a supermax-type prison under near-lockdown conditions. Falkoff indicated that ―[a]s far as [his] clients are concerned, it‘s probably preferable for
them to remain at Guantanamo.‖222
The case of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani offers an additional example
of detainee regret and sign of a flaw in the lawfare strategy. Ghailani was
accused of involvement in the 1998 simultaneous bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.223 He was captured and ultimately detained at
GTMO.224 Ghailani raised issues of torture and mistreatment at the hands of
the CIA, and ultimately won his release from the military commissions system.225 Instead, he was to be tried in federal court in New York. But, similar
to a tactic used by Khadr, Ghailani continuously refused to attend his federal court hearings because he objected to the strip searches that were required
to be conducted prior to transfer to court.226 Ghailani then expressed his
desire to return to GTMO and be tried via a military commission.227 It is
unknown whether this is merely another legal tactic or genuine desire, but it
is interesting to note that Ghailani‘s psychologist was the initial person to
raise this request during a hearing as opposed to an advocate or legal counsel.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to wage a sustained counterattack to the tactical lawfare initiatives, it is recommended that legal options be complimented with less
theoretical and consequently more practical solutions. This includes: 1) a
uniform and attached detainee documentation form; 2) indigenous training;
and 3) a unified media plan.228
A.

A Uniform and Attached Detainee Documentation Form

The government should adopt a uniform document relating to detainee treatment and physical/mental health. This proposed internal-use document would be standardized across all government agencies and geared
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specifically toward detainees captured on the battlefield. The form will attach itself to the detainee as soon as the detainee is taken into custody or as
soon as practical as may be the case when large numbers of suspected combatants are captured. In this manner, as the detainee passes through various
stages of confinement, information can continue to be added to this document, which will follow the detainee through the life of his or her detention.
Information will include preexisting injuries, breaks in reporting, and medical reviews at each stage so that oversight will always be available.
Much of the relevant information is currently gathered and passed
into detainee files via various scattered means depending on the custodial
agency and location, as well as portable biometric equipment that can be
collected at the initial point of capture. However, it is recommended that a
single, standardized form be created beginning from as close to the point of
capture as possible that encompasses all of the elements relating to the issue
of detainee treatment. This standardized approach will compensate for the
modern asymmetrical warfare approach where law enforcement agencies,
military, and intelligence agencies have all engaged in capturing suspected
enemy combatants on the global battlefield. This standardized form also
may be classified at each level of the detainee‘s custody by a designated
security reviewer. In this manner, the overall governmental interest in protecting national security assets will not be compromised by the need to document detainee treatment. A legal officer embedded in the operational area
as opposed to detached administrative locations also can better assist in a
timely manner in ensuring proper and standardized documentation or action
as it pertains to each individual detainee. While an extra layer of bureaucracy is not always needed to fight an asymmetrical battle, this proposal would
actually streamline the number of layers relating to individual detainee
treatment as well as the process of investigating claims.
The practical approach of this proposed standardized form is that it
provides an easy review process for when abuse claims are reported. This
means that commanders on the ground can quickly investigate such abuse
claims and dispense of the erroneous ones quickly and seamlessly as opposed to engaging in a long and intensive process for each complaint.
Moreover, the document, which for practical purposes will nearly always be
classified as at least secret, will provide signed information of witnesses,
medical personnel and chain of custody that can streamline the investigative
process at all levels of the detainee‘s custody. Remember, the government
typically has the burden of proof when a detainee alleges mistreatment in
court. Therefore, this proposed document can become the standard and accepted courtroom and administrative rebuttal evidence to combat such allegations. In military commissions and federal court, CIPA or MRCE 505 can
be used to initiate classified court proceedings to review the document. In
this post Detainee Treatment Act environment, creating and using this standardized evidentiary tool could cause the aforementioned tactical lawfare

File: Lebowitz 2

390

Created on: 1/9/2011 9:48:00 PM

Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:09:00 PM

CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L.

[Vol. 43:357

approach to gradually fizzle out in the future as the complaints are seamlessly disproven in an organized fashion. At the same time, legitimate complaints can be better separated from the faux torture.
B.

Indigenous Training

Related to the standardized documentation proposal, it is further
recommended that indigenous forces be specifically trained to document
detainee treatment prior to transfer of custody. The issue of indigenous
abuse has been reported in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Such abuse
was cited, for example, as a prime reason for the suppression of Muhammad
Jawad‘s admissions and ultimate release from GTMO. Although it could
take some time to fully gain compliance among indigenous forces, proper
training in documenting detainee treatment in this area can only help in separating legitimate claims from fake or exaggerated allegations.
C.

A Unified Media Plan

A unified media and public relations plan needs to be implemented,
particularly when it comes to military commissions cases. The current military public relations structure revolves almost exclusively around a Public
Affairs Officer (PAO). The problem with this structure is that military
PAOs are inherently reactionary to outside attacks. This means that the typical military public relations strategy is to wait for negative attention to develop before a response is levied. By the time a PAO releases the government side of the story, it is too late and public opinion is already slanted.
This is true even if the government story is one hundred percent accurate. In
an operational environment in Afghanistan, for example, unfounded claims
of detainee abuse can quickly spiral into real-time violence and attacks
against allied forces as literally hours matter in the war over public relations. At a grander level, the cumulative approach of claiming abuse causes
such fallacies as the perception that GTMO is home to incessant torture,
cages, and orange jumpsuits. At the trial level, outside organizations and
advocates often control the narrative through spin that can be proven either
fabricated or grossly uninformed.
The unified media plan is meant to be proactive while maintaining
ethical standards. Standard operating procedure should be to get the word
out via traditional unclassified means as soon as practical in terms of manpower and operational intelligence. Relating to a trial scenario, it is recommended that two distinct teams operate to get the message out. In this plan,
Team 1 will be the PAO. The PAO is the subject matter expert for the overall media universe and will be on hand for all press conferences and informed of all media endeavors relating to the specific case. The PAO is best
equipped to comment on overall and generalized questions pertaining to the
legal process. Meanwhile, Team 2 relates to the prosecutors. The prosecu-
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tors are the subject matter experts for the specific case. In other words, the
prosecutors‘ lane focuses solely on the case-specific factual information as
prescribed under American Bar Association or complimentary ethical
guidelines. All other questions will be deferred to the PAO. Once charges
are sworn, the government will be able to state the case-specific truth under
the ethical bar guidelines afforded to the prosecution. In fact, these ethical
rules would provide a safeguard in terms of preventing the prosecution from
deviating beyond the general, unrhetorical facts. But, the ultimate goal of
this unified media recommendation is to place the government on equal
footing in terms of getting the real story out as opposed to a completely
skewed version.
VI. CONCLUSION
Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives have engaged in a nuanced form of
lawfare that is more tactical in nature.229 This tactical lawfare concept has a
direct impact on military and intelligence operations from the lowest levels
on up.230 While traditional lawfare approaches relate to broader, bigger attacks against mostly western governments, the use of tactical lawfare has
manifested itself directly on the battlefield by achieving tactical goals that
historically were limited to conventional physical acts of warfare.231 As
such, military and intelligence tactics have changed, personnel are diverted
from engaging in operational or support roles, and operational momentum is
stunted among other results.232
Much of the tactical lawfare success revolves around the principle
of claiming detainee abuse regardless of merit. Of course, the U.S. Government did itself no favors by condoning limited instances of detainee abuse
between 2001 and 2005.233 But, while those instances were certainly limited
in scope, they essentially removed the government‘s benefit of the doubt on
the detainee treatment issue and consequently left an opening within the
legal and administrative system to be exploited.234 In addition, U.S. allies
such as the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Australia were deemed complicit and ultimately fell under similar levels of courtroom exploitation.235
Armed with this foundation of documented abuse, accused terror operatives
initiated a cumulative practice of inundating legal and administrative sys229
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tems with allegation after allegation of torture. Some claims had merit while
many others were murky at best. But, regardless of the merits, the global
and cumulative tactic succeeded in directly altering the fight on the battlefield. Hence, the concept of tactical lawfare.
While the overall lawfare approach has been rather successful, it
has perhaps been waged too well to some degree.236 Particularly with the
Obama administration‘s attempt to transfer GTMO detainees to a U.S. prison facility, the impact of this cumulative approach has come to roost at the
individual detainee level.237 Starting in late 2009, detainees and their advocates have found themselves in the awkward position of demanding that
they remain at GTMO due to the better living conditions and/or to avoid
torture in their home countries.238 Meanwhile, although western governments have been slow to recognize the tactical lawfare effect on their ability
to wage war against terrorist organizations, efforts have begun to fight back.
As such, a system is needed that can counter the tactical lawfare attacks at
every stage of the detainee process. This means recognizing that tactical
lawfare is an enemy strategy and working to diminish its success as early as
possible during the course of a detainee‘s custody. By starting at the beginning of detention to cut off a detainee‘s ability to wage a meritless claim of
abuse, the tactical lawfare practice as discussed above will gradually fizzle
out.
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